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While both economic and social considerations of fairness and equity play an important
role in financial decision-making, it is not clear which of these two motives is more primal
and immediate and which one is secondary and slow. Here we used variants of the
ultimatum game to examine this question. Experiment 1 shows that acceptance rate of
unfair offers increases when participants are asked to base their choice on their gut-
feelings, as compared to when they thoroughly consider the available information. In
line with these results, Experiments 2 and 3 provide process evidence that individuals
prefer to first examine economic information about their own utility rather than social
information about equity and fairness, even at the price of foregoing such social
information. Our results suggest that people are more economically rational at the core,
but social considerations (e.g., inequality aversion) require deliberation, which under
certain conditions override their self-interested impulses.
Keywords: ultimatum game, cooperation, fairness, financial decision-making, dual-process, social utility,
inequality aversion
Introduction
The classical economic model suggests that individuals are rational, free of any extraneous
considerations, and follow the principle of utility maximizing. Financial decisions are assumed to
be entirely selfish and self-interested and no room is given for social motivations (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944; Becker, 1962; Kahneman et al., 1986). By contrast, psychological research
suggests that even under this type of decisions cooperation is verymuch alive, and that individuals are
more social oriented than portrayed by the basic rational economicmodel (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
The consistent deviations from the Homo economicus rational model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Fehr and Gächter, 2000), provide ample evidence that financial decisions are governed by more
than mere economic selfish motives (e.g., Cameron, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Gino et al.,
2009). One robust demonstration of this mix of motives is found in the ultimatum game, a bilateral
bargaining setting which allows economic and social influences to be examined (Tabibnia et al.,
2008). In the classical ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), one individual (the proposer) makes a
proposal on how to divide a sum of money (the pie) with a second individual. The responder has
then the opportunity to either accept the proposed division, in which case both players earn the
amount proposed, or reject it, in which case both earn nothing. While the classical economic model
suggests that proposers should offer the smallest possible amount, and responders should accept it,
the typical results suggest that proposers tend to offer a fair share of 40–50% of the pie, and that
the majority of respondents reject unfair (below 30%) offers (e.g., Güth et al., 1982; for a review, see
Camerer and Thaler, 1999).
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Thus, as in many other behavioral phenomena, evidence
from the ultimatum game clearly supports the assertion that
social considerations of equity and fairness, and not just selfish
economic factors play an important role in financial decision-
making. However, it is not yet clear which of the two is more
primal and immediate and which one is secondary and slower
(see, e.g., Lucas and Wagner, 2005). Which considerations,
economic or social, are more primary, when we make complex
financial decisions?
There has been a recent upsurge in theories that characterize
human cognition and specifically choice behavior as governed
by the interaction between two different systems (e.g., Epstein,
1994; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Bechara and Damasio,
2005; Evans, 2007). System 1, which is assumed to be fast,
automatic, associative and emotionally charged, and System 2,
which is assumed to be slow, deliberative, and affect-free. This
dual-system approach leads to two contrasting models to describe
the primacy of motives governing financial decision-making.
The first model, suggests that we are more social in nature, but
deliberative considerations make us more focused on economic
considerations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). According to this
model, which is more consistent with the psychological view,
emotional considerations are the social and selfless elements,
while deliberative considerations are the more analytical and
focused on utility maximizing (Pillutla andMurnighan, 1996). By
contrast, the second model suggests that economic self-interest
is primal (Dawkins, 1990), but these motives are overridden
by acquired social preferences for equity and altruism (Moore
and Loewenstein, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005). According to this
model, which is more consistent with the classical economic
view, people’s basic considerations are driven by economic self-
interest, and secondary considerations are deliberative and pro-
social. Interestingly, the literature in behavioral decision making
provides empirical evidence to support both of these models.
In support of the psychological point of view, recent
neuroimaging studies suggest that unfair proposals in the
ultimatum game are associated with negative emotional
responses (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Similarly, it
has been shown that individuals are more likely to reject unfair
offers under tight time constraints (Sutter et al., 2003; Grimm and
Mengel, 2011; Neo et al., 2013). Rand et al. (2012, 2013) showed
that people cooperate more and thus demonstrate stronger
tendency toward social motives when they are forced to think fast
and use more automatic processes. Since emotional responses are
assumed to be primary (Bechara and Damasio, 2005), and time
pressure is assumed to inhibit deliberation (Usher et al., 2011;
Russo et al., 2013), these results can be interpreted as supporting
the view that people’s primary motives are social, and that their
secondary motives are economic (e.g., Rand et al., 2013). In
line with these claims, it has also been shown that non-human
primates (e.g., Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan, 2006) and
infants (Hill and Sally, 2004) are highly sensitive to fairness and
equity.
At the same time, however, it has also been shown that reliance
on affective considerations lead proposers in the ultimatum
game to make less generous offers than reliance on more
computational (deliberative) considerations (Stephen and Pham,
2008). Similarly, it has been argued that inequality aversion
(reflected by rejections of unfair offers) is a deliberative act,
which relies on self-control (Knoch and Fehr, 2007). Thus, these
results support the priority of economic elements proposed by the
classical economic view and suggest that our primary motives are
economically rational, and our secondary motives are more social
and emotional. Consistent with this view, findings from studies
employing tasks that are more analogous to the classic ultimatum
game have shown that non-human primates (e.g., Jensen et al.,
2007) and young children (Harbaugh et al., 2004) are more self-
interested than adults.
In light of these contradictory and inconsistent findings, it is
neither trivial nor clear which of these models best captures the
priority we give to different considerations in our reasoning and
behavior. In the current paper, we conducted three ultimatum
game experiments that enabled us to juxtapose these two models
and examine if the considerations of fairness and inequality
aversion that influence people’s financial decision-making are
more primary or secondary.
Experiment 1: Gut Feeling versus Thorough
Consideration
Experiment 1 used a modified version of a repeated trials
ultimatum game under time constraints. In each trial, participants
were instructed to make their decisions either quickly and based
on their primary gut-feelings or to take their time and engage
in a deliberate decision process. By confining them to these time
constraints, we were able to examine choices based on rapid and
primary motives as compared to secondary and slow motives
(Usher et al., 2011; Russo et al., 2013).
Method
Participants and Task
Fifty-one undergraduates from Duke University (average
age = 22.0 years; 25 females) participated in the experiment as
responders for monetary payoff. Participants received $5 as show
up fee and a bonus payment according to their decisions in the
game. Participants were told that they would play multiple trials
with another participant via the computer. Actually, there were
no real proposers, and all offers were made by the computer
(programmed with Visual Basic 6.0). The experiment had 50
trials. The total pie in each trial was randomly sampled from the
$10–$30 range (in $1 intervals). The split of the pie was 50:50,
60:40, 70:30, 80:20, or 90:10 (in favor of the proposer). Each
participant got 10 offers for each split presented in random order.
Participants were seated in front of the computer screen, and
were told that in each trial the proposer would be given an amount
of money (that would vary from trial to trial), and would offer to
split this amount. Participants were required to accept or reject
each offer. To facilitate their decisions, the following information
was available: the split of the total pie between them and the
other player (in percentages), and the absolute value (in USD) of
what was offered to them. To motivate their choices, participants
were told that at the end of the experiment the computer would
randomly select one of the trials in which they accepted the offer,
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and that they would be paid based on their allocated amount from
that trial.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-
subjects conditions. In the time-pressure condition (n = 18),
participants were instructed to respond to their gut feelings, and
make their choices as fast as possible. In the no-time-pressure
condition (n = 33), participants were instructed to consider all
of the available information and to take their time before making
their choice. To ensure compliance with these instructions, in
the time-pressure condition participants were further informed
that the computer would monitor their decision times, and that
they would be prompted to answer faster if their responses
were too slow (i.e., longer than 2 s). In the no-time-pressure
condition, participants were further informed to take more time
for deliberation if their responses were too fast (i.e., faster than
3 s). In addition, in both conditions participants were informed
that 10% would be deducted from their final earnings each
time they received a message that the time constraints were
violated. The Ethics committee of Duke University approved this
study.
Results
The average response time was 0.73 s (SD = 0.19) in the
time-pressure condition and 3.3 s (SD = 1.7) in the no-time-
pressure condition. An independent-samples t-test revealed that
this difference was significant [t(49) = 6.036, p < 0.0001]. These
results validate ourmanipulation and suggest that the participants
understood and adhered to the instructions to follow their gut-
feelings or to examine all the available information (depending on
the experimental condition).
The acceptance rates of each split as a function of the time
constraint condition are illustrated in Figure 1. In line with
previous findings, the majority of fair proposals (30% and above)
in each phase were accepted, and acceptance rates decreased
almost linearly as the offers became less fair. However, contrary
to previous research (e.g., Sutter et al., 2003), when the offers were
unfair, acceptance rates were much higher in the time-pressure
condition than in the no-time-pressure condition (e.g., 27 versus
7% for an 80:20 split, and 19 versus 2% for a 90:10 split). No
difference in acceptance rates was observed for fair proposals.
A 5 (offered split)  2 (time constraint condition) repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect for split
[F(4,196) = 178.572, p < 0.0001] and a significant split  time-
pressure interaction [F(4,196) = 6.495, p < 0.0001] on
acceptance rates. No main effect was found for the time-pressure
manipulation [F(1,49) = 1.43, p = 0.26]. Planned contrasts
further revealed a significant difference between acceptance
rate in the no-time-pressure and time-pressure conditions for
the (unfair) 80/20 (p < 0.005) and 90/10 (p < 0.02) splits.
These results suggest that encouraging primary considerations
(gut-feelings) led to higher acceptance rates of unfair offers. Since
social-interest considerations predict a decrease in acceptance
rates when the offer is unfair (i.e., inequality aversion), the higher
acceptance rates in the time-pressure condition compared to the
no-time-pressure condition suggest that the economic motives
are more primal and rapid whereas considerations of fairness and
equity are more secondary and slow.
FIGURE 1 | Acceptance rates of each split as a function of the time
constraint condition in Experiment 1. Error bars are depicted in black
lines. **p < 0.02, ***p < 0.0005.
Experiment 2: Pattern of Information
Search
Experiment 1 showed that inequality aversion reflected by
rejecting unfair offers in the ultimatumgame reduced significantly
when individuals were forced to respond rapidly. In Experiment
2 we aimed to further explore the underlying processes behind
this behavior. The experiment used the same ultimatum game
task as in Experiment 1, with a few modifications: participants
were provided with all the possible information in the ultimatum
game (i.e., the pie, the split, the allocated sum of the proposer,
and the allocated sum to the responder), but only one piece of
information was available at a time, and responders were required
to select which information they wanted to see at each point in
time, and in what order. Based on the mouselab method (Johnson
et al., 1989), examining the order of information search enables to
explore the information acquisition processes of decision makers.
Assuming that people give priority to, and focus more on, the
most important information (Payne et al., 1993), we used the
order of information acquisition to assess the relative importance
participants assigned to economic (personal gain) versus inequity
(the split) information.
In addition, since the standard ultimatum game is based on
a one-shot decision with no time constraints, we wanted to test
the repeated-trials paradigm used in Experiment 1 without time
constraints and see if it replicates traditional ultimatum game
findings.
Method
Participants and Task
Thirty-one undergraduates from Duke University (average
age = 21.4 years; 19 females) participated in the experiment for
monetary payoff. Participants received $5 as show up fee and a
bonus payment according to their decisions in the game. The
task was identical to the ultimatum game in Experiment 1, with
the exception that the available information was the pie (i.e.,
the total available amount of money), the split of this amount
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between the participant and the other player, the absolute amount
of money that would be allocated to the other player, and the
absolute amount of money that was offered to the participant.
However, all types of information were hidden, and were only
displayed when participants pressed a button corresponding to
the desired information. Participants were able to explore the
available information as much as they wanted, and in any order,
but they could only look at one piece of information at a time.
The Ethics committee of Duke University approved this study.
To examine whether the repeated trials had an effect on
acceptance rate, we included 60 trials that were divided into three
blocks each consisting of 1/3 of the trials.
Results
As in Experiment 1 the majority of fair proposals were accepted,
and acceptance rates decreased as the offers became less fair.
A 5 (offered split)  3 (blocks of trials) repeated measures
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for split on acceptance
rates [F(4,88) = 38.089, p < 0.0001], but not for blocks of
trials [F(2,44) = 0.754, p = 0.48].1 Planned contrasts further
demonstrated that there was no difference in acceptance rate
between the first third of trials and the last third of trials (p= 0.66),
or between the second third of trials and the last third of trials
(p= 0.45). This pattern of results validates our design, as it concurs
with previous findings that acceptance rate is highly dependent on
fairness and not onmaterial opportunism, and found no effect for
repeated trials.
Next, to examine the order of information search, we analyzed
the proportion of times in which each type of information was
selected first, as well as the overall proportion for selecting each
type of information. These results are illustrated in Figure 2.
Across all trials participants preferred to examine personal-utility
information first; namely information about what was allocated
to themselves was selected first in 40% (SD = 40) of the times.
By contrast, social-utility information about the split was selected
first only in 18% (SD = 32) of the times. Information about what
was allocated to the other person and the pie were selected first
in 36% (SD = 39) and 6% (SD = 19) of the times, respectively. A
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that these differences were
significant [F(3,90) = 4.707, p < 0.005]. Similar results were
obtained for the proportion of selecting each type of information
across all information-search steps. Information about personal
gainswas selected in 43% (SD= 16) of the time, information about
the gain of the other player 27% (SD= 15) of the time, information
about the split 21% (SD= 18) of the time, and information about
the pie 9% (SD= 11) of the time [F(3,90) = 20.036, p< 0.0001].
Since participants showed a high preference to examine
information about their own gain first and only then social
information about the split, these results support the assertion
that the economic elements get priority over those of fairness and
are considered as preliminary in the decision process. However,
even though participants preferred to evaluate personal-utility
information first, they later examined other types of information.
Thus, it is unclear whether information-search patterns
1A virtually identical pattern of acceptance rates was observed when we only
analyzed the first trial for each participant.
FIGURE 2 | Overall information search pattern and search pattern in
the first phase in Experiment 2. Error bars are depicted in black lines.
reflect solely the relative importance that individuals assign
to personal-utility and social-utility information. For example,
the tendency to first evaluate personal-utility information may
reflect a mere preference for using information that is more
related to self-interest to deduce other types of information
(e.g., calculating the pie or the split based on information about
their own and the other’s gains). Experiment 3 was designed
to directly address this possibility as well as to further explore
the underlying processes of the primary motives of economic
decisions.
Experiment 3: Limited Information
This experiment used the same ultimatum game task as in
Experiment 2, with the exception that the only information
available to participants was the absolute amount that was
offered to them and the percentage split. While in one condition
participants were required to choose the order of information
acquisition, in the second condition they were required to only
choose one of these two pieces of information. By confining the
available information to either howmuch theywill gain or how fair
the offer is, we were able to directly examine whether participants
preferred to base their decision solely on more economic or more
social information.
Method
Participants and Task
Forty-four undergraduates from Duke University (average
age = 21.8 years; 25 females) participated in the experiment
as responders for monetary payoff. Participants received $5 as
show up fee and a bonus payment according to their decisions
in the game. The task was identical to the ultimatum game
in Experiment 2, with the exception that the only available
information was the percentage split of the total amount between
them and the other player and the absolute amount of money
that was offered to them. In addition, participants were required
to make their decisions as quickly as possible, and the time they
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FIGURE 3 | Acceptance rates of each split as a function of
experimental condition in Experiment 3. Error bars are depicted in black
lines.
spent on each type of information was recorded by the computer
program.
Participantswere randomly assigned to one of the two between-
subjects conditions. In the sequential condition (n = 26),
participants were required to select which information they
wanted to see first and which to see second, but they could
examine both types of information. In the choose-one condition
(n = 18), participants were required to select which information
they wanted to see, but they could only examine one type of
information. The Ethics committee of Duke University approved
this study.
Results
The acceptance rates of each split are illustrated in Figure 3.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the majority of fair proposals were
accepted, and acceptance rates decreased as the offers became
less fair. A 5 (split)  2 (sequential versus choose-one) repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for split on
acceptance rates [F(4,168)= 115.047, p< 0.0001], but not for the
experimental condition [F(1,42) = 1.43, p= 0.24].
In the sequential condition, where participants were required to
select which type of information theywanted to see first andwhich
one second, personal-utility information (about what was offered
to them) was selected first 77% (SD = 36) of the time. Similarly,
in the choose-one condition, where only one type of information
could be examined, most participants selected to examine only
what was offered to them (78%, SD = 26). These results are
illustrated in Figure 4. As can be seen, these results concur with
the results of Experiment 1 and 2, and demonstrate that whether
people have freedom to acquire all information or just part of it,
they clearly give priority to economic information over fairness.
This pattern supports the assertion that participants’ initial
considerations are more selfish in nature whereas considerations
for fairness and inequality aversion requires more time and
deliberations.
In further support of this claim, we also found that in
the choose-one condition, the average response time based on
examining just the split (2.2 s, SD = 0.8) was almost twice as
FIGURE 4 | Overall information search pattern and search pattern in
the first phase in Experiment 3. Error bars are depicted in black lines.
long as the response time based on examining the absolute value
of the offer alone [1.2 s, SD = 0.4; F(1,9) = 6.868, p < 0.05].
Short response times are assumed to reflect reliance on instantly
accessible information whereas long response times indicatemore
deliberate cognitive consideration (Ayal and Hochman, 2009).
Thus, it appears that choices that were based on purely economic
information were more rapid and primary, whereas choices that
were based on information that is more social weremore slow and
secondary.
General Discussion
Previous research suggests that both economic and social motives
play an important role in financial decision-making (Cameron,
1999; Bolton andOckenfels, 2000). In linewith these observations,
in this work we examined which of these motives is more primary
and which is more secondary.
Experiment 1 showed that acceptance rates of unfair offers
increased significantly when individuals based their decisions
on their primary gut feelings. Since economic motives such as
personal-utility lead to higher acceptance rates and social-utility
motives such as fairness and inequality aversion lead to lower
acceptance rates, these results provide evidence that economic
motives aremore rapid and primary, while socialmotives aremore
secondary and slow. In line with these results, Experiments 2 and
3 provide process evidence showing that individuals give priority
to information about personal-utility rather than about fairness
and inequality aversion, even at the price of foregoing this kind of
social information. These findings might suggest that at the core,
we are fundamentally self-interested and self-serving (Stephen
and Pham, 2008), and that social considerations such as fairness
are more deliberative and secondary (Knoch and Fehr, 2007). If
this is true, it might be argued that on a broader perspective, the
self-maximizing dogma of the classical economic view captures
the primal component of the human essence and not necessarily
our deliberate and calculated behavior.
The current data may also speak to the elusive role of
neuropsychology and neuroeconomics in understanding the
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underlying psychological processes. Previous research suggests
that fairness processing is accompanied by increased activation in
brain regions associated with emotional and automatic reactions
(Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008), such as the anterior
insula, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and the
amygdala. One interpretation of these (and other related) findings
is that the default (primary) response in financial decision-
making is driven by social-utility considerations such as fairness
(Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2005; Tabibnia et al.,
2008). Our results seem at odds with this conclusion, as we show
that the economic-selfish elements are primary, but that these
considerations can be overridden by secondary social concerns (as
reflected in participants’ final decisions). Interestingly, previous
research suggests that the VMPFC may also reflect preferential
engagement in personal-utility versus social-utility mentation
(Ames et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2009). If this is the case, our
results may point at an alternative interpretation. Specifically, the
activity in the VMPFC might reflect the evaluation of primary
personal-utility considerations. However, this evaluation might
than be overridden by effective responses (via interaction with the
amygdala and the anterior insula), which might stem from more
deliberative and secondary social-utility considerations.
In terms of the dual-systemmodels of reasoning, this approach
is typically described by an automatic and primary processes that
are biased and irrational and more delayed deliberative processes
that are primarily logical and rational (e.g., Epstein, 1994;
Evans, 2007). According to these accounts, deliberative processes
are assumed to be activated to monitor and correct irrational
automatic processes that are prone to errors (Kahneman, 2003;
Masicampo and Baumeister, 2008). Here we show that this
injective function which equates primary with irrational choice
behavior and deliberative with rational behavior does not always
stands. As our results demonstrate, there are certain situations
in which following one’s gut-feeling or acting impulsively appear
to be the rational “cold” behavior which is accompanied by
subsequent social and more “hot” considerations (see also Ayal
et al., 2011; under review; Usher et al., 2011). Interestingly, the
fact that in their final choices, people were highly sensitive to
fairness and inequality aversion suggests that contrary to what was
previously assumed, the deliberative system monitors and correct
primary considerations, evenwhen these initial considerations are
more in line with the traditional rational recommendation.
Finally, the current study offers some insights into the ways
in which affective and cognitive inputs are integrated during
the decision process. Typically, intuition is assumed to operate
on affective information whereas deliberation is linked to more
cognitive and rational considerations. In support of this view,
Small et al. (2007) showed that judgment based on emotionally-
charged inputs (e.g., an identifiable victim) is more altruistic and
others-interested, whereas more deliberative judgment based on
neutral, and unbiased inputs (e.g., statistical information about
victims) is more “rational” and self-interested. Here we provide
a qualification to these findings by showing that the output
of the cognitive system is highly dependent on the inputs to
the system and not only on the type of system that processes
it (i.e., intuitive or deliberate). Specifically, it is possible that
when people consider neutral, emotion-free, highly relevant and
unbiased information (e.g., monetary payoffs from an unknown
proposer in the ultimatum game), our gut-feelings are logical,
cold, and rational. In contrast, when the input is emotionally-
charged and involve information that cannot be easily quantified
(e.g., experienced-emotions), the same initial gut reaction might
be less rational and susceptible to wide variety of cognitive
biases.
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